El texto de Martin Heidegger Was ist das - die Philosophie? es una de las obras claves para hacer una hermenéutica de su pensamiento. En ella se explica como lo que pretendía la filosofía en su origen no tiene un correlato con sus conquistas a lo largo de la tradición, que están más bien teñidas de un tinte racionalista que obvia los estados afectivos, tan necesarios para entender el pensar filosófico. De este modo, volvemos con Heidegger a remontarnos al inicio (...) de la filosofía, hasta Heráclito, para así poder establecer unas pautas que nos ayuden en nuestras disquisiciones dentro del filosofar. Para ello será necesario retomar el verdadero sentido griego de λὀγος tal y como fue planteado por Heráclito: como fluir y como lucha. --- Martin Heidegger’s text Was ist das - die Philosophie? is one of the key works to make a hermeneutic of his thought. In it he explains how what philosophy originally intended has no correlation with its conquests throughout tradition, which are rather tinged with a rationalist tint that obviates the affective states, so necessary for understanding philosophical thinking. In this way, we return with Heidegger to go back to the beginning of philosophy, until Heraclitus, so that you can establish some guidelines that help us in our disquisitions within philosophy. To do so, it will be necessary to take up again the true Greek sense of λὀγος as it was proposed by Heraclitus: how to flow and how to fight. (shrink)

Uno de los aspectos destacados del pensamiento de Martin Heidegger es la crítica a la ciencia. En Heidegger esta crítica parte del supuesto de la falta de base, de soporte que la sostenga, que tiene la ciencia al no contemplar precísamente que haya de tener un fundamento último, sino que se centra únicamente en su propio progreso sin volver la vista atrás hacia aquello que tiene como raíz. Heidegger señala en su obra en repetidas ocasiones que "la ciencia no piensa". (...) Ese no pensar de la ciencia suena en el propio Heidegger como paradójico porque la misma ciencia implica precísamente el ejercicio del pensar, siendo ese el cometido de la actividad científica. Pero a lo que se refiere Heidegger con ese no-pensar de la ciencia es a que ésta ha derivado en una ciencia del ente sin tener en cuenta para nada el ser que la funda. Nuestro propósito en este trabajo entonces será el de esclarecer la crítica a la ciencia que hace Heidegger. --- One of the highlights of Martin Heidegger's thought is criticism to science. In Heidegger, this criticism is based on the assumption of lack basis, of support that sustains, which science has to not consider precisely that it has to have an ultimate ground, but it focuses solely on its own progress without looking back to that which has as its root. Heidegger indicates in his work repeatedly that "science does not think". That not-thinking of science in Heidegger himself appears as paradoxical because precisely science itself involves the exercise of thinking, being this the task of scientific activity. But what Heidegger refers with that not-thinking of science is that this has led to a science of being (seiende) without regard to anything Being (Sein) that grounded. Our purpose in this paper then will be to clarify the critique of science that Heidegger makes. (shrink)

El objetivo propuesto en el siguiente trabajo es elucidar cómo desde la finitud de la existencia puede establecerse la problemática de la temporalidad dentro del entramado de pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. Para ello realizaremos un análisis de la conferencia de 1924 Der Begriff der Zeit, uno de los textos que allanan el camino a Sein und Zeit, en lugar de centrar la investigación en la considerada obra magna de Heidegger. Una reflexión acerca de este texto previo permitirá avanzar en el (...) análisis de la existencia al mostrar cómo el tiempo está arraigado en la existencia individual, no como un solipsismo, sino como apertura de posibilidades respecto del mundo (a la postre compartido con los otros). Una descripción fenomenológica de la muerte posibilitará la apertura al mundo, definiendo una temporalidad existencial que incluye no sólo al instante presente, sino también al pasado (concebido bajo la forma del «haber-sido») y al futuro. ---- The aim of the following paper is to elucidate how, from the finitude of existence, the problematic of temporality can be established within the framework of Martin Heidegger's thought. To this end, we will analyse the 1924 lecture Der Begriff der Zeit, one of the texts that pave the way for Sein und Zeit, instead of focusing our investigation on Heidegger's considered masterpiece. A reflection on this earlier text will advance the analysis of existence by showing how time is rooted in individual existence, not as a solipsism, but as an opening of possibilities with respect to the world (ultimately shared with others). A phenomenological description of death will make it possible to open up to the world, defining an existential temporality that includes not only the present instant, but also the past (conceived in the form of "having-been") and the future. (shrink)

Con nuestras reflexiones pretendemos mostrar la ruptura de lo familiar-cotidiano y la existencia auténtica siguiendo las premisas que Martin Heidegger expone en sus trabajos redactados alrededor de 1935. En dichos textos cobra especial importancia la poética, ya que el modo en que ésta emplea el lenguaje presupone una realidad originaria del ser humano en el que no se encuentra un hogar familiar al que debiera volver, sino que revela la situación inhóspita a la que está arrojado el ser humano, no (...) por haber emprendido una marcha desde el calor hogareño hacia lo desconocido, sino porque esa condición inhóspita es intrínseca a él mismo. ---- With our reflections, we intend to show the rupture of the familiar-daily and the authentic existence following the premises that Martin Heidegger exposes in his works written around 1935. In these texts, poetics takes on special importance, since the way in which it uses language presupposes a reality originating in the human being in which there is no family home to which he should return, but rather reveals the inhospitable situation to which the human being is thrown, not because he has embarked on a march from the warmth of the home towards the unknown, but because this inhospitable condition is intrinsic to him. (shrink)

La relación que este monográfico pretende establecer entre los dos conceptos fundamentales en torno a los que gira el título, a saber, teoría y crítica, no debe considerarse ni como una casualidad ni como algo asentado, sino que supone un problema fundamental, de ahí que sean objeto de atención a la hora de fijar los contenidos de este número. Si bien la teoría responde a un conocimiento especulativo a propósito de lo dado en lo real, la crítica es una acción (...) formal, fundada y razonada, conforme a una normativa acerca de aquello mismo dado en lo real. Esta presentación quiere dar cuenta de los contenidos de este número de Fragmentos de Filosofía. ---- The relationship that this monograph seeks to establish between the two fundamental concepts around which the title revolves, namely, theory and criticism, should not be considered either as a coincidence or as something settled, but rather as a fundamental problem, which is why they are the object of attention when it comes to establishing the contents of this issue. While theory responds to a speculative knowledge about what is given in the real, criticism is a formal, founded and reasoned action, in accordance with a norm about what is given in the real. This presentation aims to give an account of the contents of this issue of Fragmentos de Filosofía. (shrink)

Nuestro objetivo es presentar una crítica a la sociedad contemporánea a partir de una lectura de la obra de Heidegger, buscando elucidar algunos supuestos establecidos en las democracias occidentales conforme a un modelo económico capitalista, tal y como presentan su hegemonía. Desde Heidegger, términos como Ge-Stell y das Man han de ser revisados nuevamente para exponer su desarrollo en el mundo actual, mostrando cómo están inmersos dentro de las estructuras del sistema político y económico del neoliberalismo. ---- The aim of (...) this study is to present a critique of contemporary society’s structures based on a reading of Heidegger’s work, seeking to elucidate some assumptions established in Western democracies according to a capitalist economic model, as they present their hegemony. Since Heidegger, terms such as Ge-Stell and das Man have to be revisited again to expose their development in today’s world, showing how they are immersed within the structures of the political and economic system of neoliberalism. (shrink)

El objetivo que se persigue es pensar la relación que hay entre la técnica y la metafísica dentro de la trama de sentido de la contemporaneidad, tal y como se presenta en la filosofía de Martin Heidegger, en 1953, en la conferencia Die Frage nach der Technik. Uno de los principales hitos del filósofo alemán en su época tardia es su concepción de la técnica, más concretamente, de la esencia de ésta, toda vez que considera que es la forma en (...) que el ser se devela en el mundo contemporáneo. Esta idea principal, la de constituir el develamiento del ser, lo pone en relación con los presupuestos que casi un cuarto de siglo antes, en 1929, en la conferencia Was ist Metaphysik?, planteaba respecto de la metafísica y de la imposibilidad de toda ciencia para pensar el problema del ser. En el mundo contemporáneo, la ciencia ha derivado en tecno-ciencia, por lo que es necesario establecer la relación entre lo dicho en una y otra conferencia con el propósito de establecer la esencia de la técnica (y de la ciencia) hoy como ese modo fundamental de darse el ser. Pero ya el ser presenta su ocaso y, por ende, cualquier relación se muestra borrosa, por lo que hay que volver al mundo griego, una vez más, como es habitual en los planteamientos heideggerianos, para tratar de esclarecer esa conexión fundamental. ---- The objective pursued is to think about the relationship between technique and metaphysics within the contemporary fabric of meaning, as presented in Martin Heidegger's philosophy, in 1953, in the lecture Die Frage nach der Technik. One of the main milestones of the German philosopher in his late period is his conception of technique, more specifically, of the essence of technique, since he considers it to be the way in which being is revealed in the contemporary world. This main idea, that of constituting the unveiling of being, puts him in relation with the assumptions that almost a quarter of a century earlier, in 1929, in the lecture Was ist Metaphysik?, he put forward with respect to metaphysics and the impossibility of all science to think the problem of being. In the contemporary world, science has become techno-science, and it is therefore necessary to establish the relationship between the two lectures in order to establish the essence of technology (and science) today as this fundamental way of giving being. But being is already in its twilight, and thus any relation is blurred, so we must return to the Greek world, once again, as is usual in Heideggerian approaches, in order to try to clarify this fundamental connection. ---- O objetivo perseguido é pensar a relação entre técnica e metafísica no tecido contemporâneo de sentido, tal como apresentado na filosofia de Martin Heidegger, em 1953, na palestra Die Frage nach der Technik. Um dos principais marcos do filósofo alemão no seu período tardio é a sua conceção da técnica, mais especificamente, da essência da técnica, uma vez que a considera como o modo pelo qual o ser se revela no mundo contemporâneo. Esta ideia principal, a de constituir o desvelamento do ser, coloca-o em relação com os pressupostos que quase um quarto de século antes, em 1929, na conferência Was ist Metaphysik? No mundo contemporâneo, a ciência tornou-se tecnociência, pelo que é necessário estabelecer a relação entre as duas conferências, a fim de estabelecer a essência da tecnologia (e da ciência) atual como esta forma fundamental de dar o ser. Mas o ser já está no seu crepúsculo e, por isso, qualquer relação é ténue, pelo que temos de regressar ao mundo grego, mais uma vez, como é habitual nas abordagens heideggerianas, para tentar clarificar esta ligação fundamental. (shrink)

Con relativa frecuencia el pensamiento de Martin Heidegger es presentado como el de un crítico exacerbado contra la ciencia. Esa crítica es puesta bajo sospecha por su participación política en el nacionalsocialismo y es tachada, en muchos casos sin fundamento alguno, de reaccionaria, de suponer un paso atrás en la línea del progreso. Sin embargo, el propio Heidegger muestra que no hay nada más alejado de la realidad: Su pretensión no es anular la ciencia, sino reconducirla, servir de faro para (...) todas las ciencias, sin distinción entre ciencias de la naturaleza y ciencias del espíritu. El propósito heideggeriano es establecer una suerte de pre-ciencia que sirva para orientar a todas las ciencias (sean de la naturaleza o del espíritu). Este estudio pretende exponer como esa pre-ciencia sirve de guía para la ciencia y como puede convertirse en un puente que sirva para unir las dos orillas de la ciencia. ---- Relatively often Martin Heidegger's thought is presented as that of an exacerbated critic of science. This criticism is put under suspicion for his political participation in National Socialism and is accused, in many cases without any basis, of being reactionary, of being a step backwards in the line of progress. However, Heidegger himself shows that nothing is further from the truth: His intention is not to annul science, but to redirect it, to serve as a beacon for all sciences, without distinction between the sciences of nature and the sciences of the spirit. The Heideggerian purpose is to establish a kind of pre-science that serves to guide all sciences (whether of nature or of the spirit). We will seek to expose how this pre-science serves as a guide for science and how it can become a bridge that serves to unite the two shores of science. (shrink)

El objetivo del siguiente trabajo es la exposición de la posibilidad de una política a partir de la obra del filósofo alemán Martin Heidegger. Es conocida su adhesión al nacionalsocialismo cuando Hitler accede al poder en 1933. La pregunta que surge es si esta adhesión tiene que ver con el anhelo de una revolución y en que consiste ésta. La idea que aquí se desarrolla es que la existencia en cuanto tal denota lo político y es desde ahí desde donde (...) emerge la posibilidad de un cuestionarse acerca de los fundamentos de la estructura organizativa de la sociedad, posibilitando la posibilidad de un reinicio político, con la mirada puesta en el origen mismo: en la πὀλις griega. ----- The aim of the following work is to expose the possibility of a politics based on the work of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger. His adherence to National Socialism when Hitler came to power in 1933 is well known. The question that arises is whether this adherence has anything to do with the desire for revolution and what it consists of. The idea that is developed here is that existence as such denotes the political, and it is from there that the possibility of questioning the foundations of the organizational structure of society emerges, making possible the possibility of a political restart, with a view to the very origin: in the Greek πὀλις. (shrink)

Por todos es sabido la relación que el filósofo Martin Heidegger tuvo con el nacionalsocialismo en los años treinta, cuando comenzó el auge de lo que se denominó Tercer Reich. También es sabido que tras la derrota de Alemania en la II Guerra Mundial, Heidegger guardó silencio sobre el Holocausto. Paul Celan, poeta judío que sufrió en los campos de concentración nazis, tuvo una serie de encuentros y desencuentros con el pensador de Friburgo. Celan esperaba que Heidegger emitiera una palabra (...) de perdón, palabra que aunaría la grandeza filosófica de Heidegger con la grandeza "humanitaria". Pero Heidegger, como decíamos, guardo silencio. La cuestión que queremos tomar al hilo de estos encuentro y desencuentros entre Heidegger y Celan es si es posible pensar Auschwitz después de Auschwitz, si es una tarea necesaria o si el horror del campo de concentración ha dejarse a la voz del poeta, ya que es posible que la poesía expresé mejor lo que sucedió. O, si por el contrario, tras Auschwitz sólo debe quedar el silencio, silencio como aquel en el que Heidegger permaneció. Auschwitz supone el culmen de la Modernidad, una Modernidad tecnificada, donde no hay sitio para la poesía. Pero tras Auschwitz hay poesía, como la poesía de Celan, por lo que cabría preguntarnos si estamos ante una nueva Modernidad o estamos en otro tiempo, en el tiempo del silencio tras Auschwitz. ---- For all we know Heidegger had relationship with National-Socialism in the thirties, when the boom began what was called Third Reich. It´s also know that after the defeat of Germany in the II World War, Heidegger remained silent about the Holocaust. Paul Celan, jewish poet who suffered in Nazi concentration camps, had a series of meetings and disagreements with the thinker of Freiburg. Celan hope thar Heidegger give a word of forgiveness, a word that would combine Heidegger's philosophical greatness with "humanitarian" greatness. But Heidegger, as mentioned, remained silent. The question we want take the thread of these meetings and disagreements between Heidegger and Celan is whether it's possible think Auschwitz, if it's a necesary task or the horror of the concentratión camp is to be left to the voice of the poet, because it´s possible that the poetry expresses better what happened. Or, if instead, after Auschwitz shoul only be silence, silence as one in which Heidegger remained. Auschwitz represents the culmination of Modernity, a tech modernity, where there isn't place for poetry. But after Auschwitz there is poetry, as Celan poetry, so we would ask ourselves whether we have a new modernity or we are in other time, the time of silence after Auschwitz. (shrink)

Nuestra propuesta es desarrollar una teoría política a partir del pensamiento de Martin Heidegger. En la biografía de Heidegger, la vinculación que tiene con la política pasa por ser miembro del Partido Nazi (NSDAP) pero en su filosofía sólo hace algunas referencias explícitas a la cuestión de la vida en comunidad. Sin embargo, lo que pretendemos es que a partir de conceptos como Volk (pueblo) y de la estructura ontológica fundamental de Mit-sein (Ser-con) se pueda establecer una filosofía política de (...) Heidegger, bastante alejada de la barbarie política que supone el nazismo. Para ello hay que desgranar la terminología heideggeriana y definir claramente qué es el Volk y su relación con el Dasein, el individuo particular, y la estructura antes señalada como Mit-sein. La idea general es que el colectivo, la comunidad, se llama Volk y es ese Volk el que dota de Ser a ese ente tan particular llamado Dasein. ---- Our proposal is to develop a political theory from Martin Heidegger's thinking. In Heidegger's biography, the link that he has with politics passes through being a member of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) but in his philosophy he just makes a few explicit references to the question of community life. However, what we intend is that from concepts like Volk (people) and from the fundamental ontological structure of Mit-sein (Being-with) can be established a Heidegger's political philosophy, quite far from the political barbarism that entail the Nazism. For this we have to thresh Heideggerian terminology and clearly define what Volk is and its relation with Dasein, the particular individual, and the structure earlier indicated as Mit-sein. The general idea is that the collective, the community, is called Volk and it is that Volk which endow with Being that entity so particular called Dasein. (shrink)

A partir del pensamiento presentado por Martin Heidegger en Sein und Zeit, podemos elaborar una crítica a la Modernidad filosófica. A nuestro juicio, los presupuestos de esa Modernidad parten del error cartesiano de la dualidad del mundo en dos dominios: la res extensa y la res cogitans, el cuerpo y el alma. A partir de ese error, la filosofía deriva en una ciencia del ente, que no tiene en cuenta al ser, núcleo del pensar filosófico. A partir del concepto heideggeriano (...) de Dasein podemos mostrar como no hay tal dualidad y como es necesario un giro radical en la filosofía. --- As of thought presente by Martin Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, we can develop a critique of philosophical Modernity. In our view, the budgets of the Modernity starts of the Cartesian mistake of the duality of the world in two domains: res extensa and res cogitans, body and soul. From that mistake, philosophy leads to a science of being, which does not considerer the Being, core of philosophical thinking. From Heidegger's concept of Dasein we can show how there is no such duality and as a radical change is necessary in philosophy. (shrink)

El existenciario del cuidado (Sorge) es uno de los elementos de mayor importancia en el entramado filosófico de Martin Heidegger. El cometido de nuestro trabajo es elaborar la relación que tiene ese existenciario con otros tres que consideramos fundamentales: ser-en-el-mundo (In-der-Welt-sein), ser-con (Mit-sein) y el Uno impersonal (das Man). Una panorámica propedéutica de la relación con ellos puede elucidarse a partir de la conferencia que Heidegger imparte en Marburgo en 1924: Der Begriff der Zeit, considerado como uno de los textos (...) clave de los que allanan el camino a Sein und Zeit, la considerada obra magna del pensador de la Selva Negra. ---- The existential of care (Sorge) is one of the most important elements in Martin Heidegger's philosophical framework. The task of our work is to elaborate the relationship that this existentialism has with three others that we consider fundamental: being in the world (In-der-Welt-sein), being with (Mit-sein) and the impersonal One (das Man). A propaedeutic overview of the relationship with them can be elucidated from the lecture Heidegger gives in Marburg in 1924: Der Begriff der Zeit, considered one of the key texts of those who pave the way to Sein und Zeit, the considered masterpiece of the Black Forest thinker. (shrink)

Nuestro propósito es dilucidar la posibilidad de un planteamiento de lo político en el pensamiento de Heidegger. Es sabido que éste estuvo vinculado biográficamente al nazismo, pero creemos que en su filosofía hay conexiones con lo político más allá de la adhesión a la política del NSDAP. Es por eso que hemos de rastrear la posibilidad de una ontología de lo político, que exponga la preocupación por la vida en colectividad, y es en Heidegger donde encontramos una serie de pautas (...) a partir de las que desarrollar esa ontología, no desde la óptica de una filosofía política o una politología, sino desde el pensamiento acerca de los otros, de los demás con los que compartimos mundo, de la mera convivencia del uno con el otro. Siguiendo esto, usando las herramientas legadas por Heidegger, desmontaremos la política contemporánea, que creemos que no ha comprendido el sentido ontológico de lo político mismo, e iniciaremos el desarrollo de una ontología de lo político que nos permita elucubrar la construcción fáctica de una nueva política dentro de un nuevo marco ontológico existencial. ---- Our purpose is to elucidate the possibility of a political approach in Heidegger's thinking. It is known that he was biographically linked to Nazism, but we believe that in his philosophy there are connections with the political beyond adherence to NSDAP policy. That is why we have to trace the possibility of an ontology of the political, which exposes the concern for life in collectivity, and it is in Heidegger where we find a series of guidelines from which to develop that ontology, not from the perspective of a political philosophy or a politology, but from the thought about others, about the others with whom we share the world, about the mere coexistence of one with the other. Following this, using the tools bequeathed by Heidegger, we will dismantle contemporary politics, which we believe has not understood the ontological sense of the political itself, and we will initiate the development of an ontology of the political that allows us to elucidate the factual construction of a new policy within a new existential ontological framework. (shrink)

It is common in political theory and practice to challenge normatively ambitious proposals by saying that their fulfillment is not feasible. But there has been insufficient conceptual exploration of what feasibility is, and very little substantive inquiry into why and how it matters for thinking about social justice. This paper provides one of the first systematic treatments of these issues, and proposes a dynamic approach to the relation between justice and feasibility that illuminates the importance of political imagination and dynamic (...) duties to expand agents’ power to fulfill ambitious principles of justice. (shrink)

This paper offers an exploration of the socialist principle “From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs.” The Abilities/Needs Principle is arguably the ethical heart of socialism but, surprisingly, has received almost no attention by political philosophers. I propose an interpretation of the principle and argue that it involves appealing ideas of solidarity, fair reciprocity, recognition of individual differences, and meaningful work. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I analyze Marx’s formulation of the Abilities/Needs Principle. Second, (...) I identify the principle’s initial plausibility, but show that it faces serious problems that cannot be addressed without developing a fresh interpretation of it. Third, I provide an interpretation of the principle that highlights demands concerning opportunities for self-realization in work, positive duties of solidarity, sensitivity to individual differences, and mechanisms of fair reciprocity. Fourth, I discuss a possible institutional implementation of the Abilities/Needs Principle. Finally, I identify some normative puzzles about the transition from capitalism to socialism, and suggest how the Abilities/Needs Principle might gain motivational traction by mobilizing the powerful idea of human dignity. (shrink)

What is a duty of justice? And how is it different from a duty of beneficence? We need a clear account of the contrast. Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the philosophical literature as to how to characterize it. Different articulations of it have been provided, but it is hard to identify a common core that is invariant across them. In this paper, I propose an account of how to understand duties of justice, explain how it contrasts with several proposals (...) as to how to distinguish justice and beneficence, respond to some objections and suggest further elaborations of it. The conceptual exploration pursued in this paper has practical stakes. A central aim is to propose and defend a capacious concept of justice that makes a direct discussion of important demands of justice (domestic and global) possible. Duties of justice can be positive besides negative, they can be imperfect as well as perfect, they can range over personal besides institutional contexts, they can include multiple associative reasons such us non-domination, non-exploitation and reciprocity, and they can even go beyond existing national, political, and economic associative frameworks to embrace strictly universal humanist concerns. We should reject ideological abridgments of the concept of justice that render these possibilities, and the important human interests and claims they may foster, invisible. (shrink)

This paper explores the connections between human rights, human dignity, and power. The idea of human dignity is omnipresent in human rights discourse, but its meaning and point is not always clear. It is standardly used in two ways, to refer to a normative status of persons that makes their treatment in terms of human rights a proper response, and a social condition of persons in which their human rights are fulfilled. This paper pursues three tasks. First, it provides an (...) analysis of the content and an interpretation of the role of the idea of human dignity in current human rights discourse. The interpretation includes a pluralist view of human interests and dignity that avoids a narrow focus on rational agency. Second, this paper characterizes the two aspects of human dignity in terms of capabilities. Certain general human capabilities are among the facts that ground status-dignity, and the presence of certain more specific capabilities constitutes condition-dignity. Finally, this paper explores how the pursuit of human rights and human dignity links to distributions and uses of power. Since capabilities are a form of power, and human rights are in part aimed at respecting and promoting capabilities, human rights involve empowerment. Exploring the connections between human rights, capabilities, and empowerment provides resources to defend controversial human rights such as the right to democratic political participation, and to respond to worries about the feasibility of their fulfillment. This paper also argues that empowerment must be coupled with solidaristic concern in order to respond to unavoidable facts of social dependency and vulnerability. (shrink)

This paper presents a reconstruction of and some constructive comments on Thomas Pogge’s conception of global justice. Using Imre Lakatos’s notion of a research program, the paper identifies Pogge’s “hard core” and “protective belt” claims regarding the scope of fundamental principles of justice, the object and structure of duties of global justice, the explanation of world poverty, and the appropriate reforms to the existing global order. The paper recommends some amendments to Pogge’s program in each of the four areas.

Human rights are particularly relevant in contexts in which there are significant asymmetries of power, but where these asymmetries exist the human rights project turns out to be especially difficult to realize. The stronger can use their disproportionate power both to threaten others’ human rights and to frustrate attempts to secure their fulfillment. They may even monopolize the international discussion as to what human rights are and how they should be implemented. This paper explores this tension between the normative ideal (...) of human rights and the facts of asymmetric power. It has two objectives. The first, pursued in section 2, is to reconstruct and assess a set of important power-related worries about human rights. These worries are sometimes presented as falsifying the view that human rights exist, or at least as warranting the abandonment of human rights practice. The paper argues that the worries do not support such conclusions. Instead, they motivate the identification of certain desiderata for the amelioration of human rights practice. The paper proceeds to articulate twelve such desiderata. The second objective, pursued in section 3, is to propose a strategy for satisfying the desiderata identified in the previous section. In particular, the paper suggests some ways to build empowerment into the human rights project that reduce the absolute and relative powerlessness of human rights holders, while also identifying an ethics of responsibility and solidarity for contexts in which power asymmetries will not dissolve. Power analysis does not debunk the human rights project. Properly articulated, it is an important tool for those pursuing it. (shrink)

Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other (...) forms of evidence, such as eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence, does not violate equal protection. (shrink)

This paper offers a justification of labor rights based on an interpretation of the idea of human dignity. According to the dignitarian approach, we have reason to organize social life in such a way that we respond appropriately to the valuable capacities of human beings that give rise to their dignity. That dignity is a deontic status in virtue of which people are owed certain forms of respect and concern. Dignity at work involves the treatment of people in accordance to (...) the ideal of solidaristic empowerment as it pertains to their life as workers. This requires that we generate feasible and reasonable social schemes to support each other as we pursue the development and exercise of our valuable capacities to produce in personally and socially beneficial ways. The spectrum of dignitarian justice goes from basic rights to decent working conditions to maximal rights to flourish in working practices that are free from domination, alienation, and exploitation. (shrink)

The literature on algorithmic fairness has examined exogenous sources of biases such as shortcomings in the data and structural injustices in society. It has also examined internal sources of bias as evidenced by a number of impossibility theorems showing that no algorithm can concurrently satisfy multiple criteria of fairness. This paper contributes to the literature stemming from the impossibility theorems by examining how informational richness affects the accuracy and fairness of predictive algorithms. With the aid of a computer simulation, we (...) show that informational richness is the engine that drives improvements in the performance of a predictive algorithm, in terms of both accuracy and fairness. The centrality of informational richness suggests that classification parity, a popular criterion of algorithmic fairness, should be given relatively little weight. But we caution that the centrality of informational richness should be taken with a grain of salt in light of practical limitations, in particular, the so-called bias-variance trade off. (shrink)

Smith argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.

Are positive duties to help others in need mere informal duties of virtue or can they also be enforceable duties of justice? In this paper I defend the claim that some positive duties (which I call basic positive duties) can be duties of justice against one of the most important prin- cipled objections to it. This is the libertarian challenge, according to which only negative duties to avoid harming others can be duties of justice, whereas positive duties (basic or nonbasic) (...) must be seen, at best, as informal moral requirements or recommendations. I focus on the contractarian version of the libertarian challenge as recently presented by Jan Narveson. I claim that Narveson’s contractarian construal of libertarianism is not only intuitively weak, but is also subject to decisive internal problems. I argue, in particular, that it does not pro- vide a clear rationale for distinguishing between informal duties of virtue and enforceable duties of justice, that it can neither successfully justify libertarianism’s protection of negative rights nor its denial of positive ones, and that it fails to undermine the claim that basic positive duties are duties of global justice. -/- . (shrink)

Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive (...) analysis of why statistical evidence should raise concerns in some cases but not others. I argue that when there is a mismatch between the specificity of the evidence and the expected specificity of the accusation, statistical evidence—as any other kind of evidence—should be considered insufficient to sustain a conviction. I rely on different stylized court cases to illustrate the explanatory power of this analysis. (shrink)

The idea of dignity is pervasive in political discourse. It is central to human rights theory and practice, and it features regularly in conceptions of social justice as well as in the social movements they seek to understand or orient. However, dignity talk has been criticized for leading to problematic exclusion. Critics challenge it for undermining our recognition of the rights of non-human animals and of many human individuals (such as children, the elderly, and people with disabilities). I argue that, (...) on a plausible articulation of it, the idea of dignity does not lead to these exclusions and that it in fact helps defend an appropriately inclusive moral and political treatment of all individuals. Difficult issues about equality and diversity indeed arise, but a dignitarian approach can provide good answers to them or at least help make them clearer and more tractable. (shrink)

The conditional analysis of ability faces familiar counterexamples involving cases of volitional incapacity. An interesting response to the problem of volitional incapacity is to try to explain away the responses elicited by such counterexamples by distinguishing between what we are able to do and what we are able to bring ourselves to do. We argue that this error-theoretic response fails. Either it succeeds in solving the problem of volitional incapacity at the cost of making the conditional analysis vulnerable to obvious (...) counterexamples to its necessity. Or, it avoids the counterexamples to its necessity but fails to solve the problem of volitional incapacity. (shrink)

The topic of alienation has fallen out of fashion in social and political philosophy. It used to be salient, especially in socialist thought and in debates about labor practices in capitalism. Although the lack of identification of people with their working lives—their alienation as workers—remains practically important, normative engagement with it has been set back by at least four objections. They concern the problems of essentialist views, a mishandling of the distinction between the good and the right, the danger of (...) paternalistic impositions, and the significance of democratic authorization. This paper recasts the critique of alienation in a way that vindicates its importance for social and political philosophy and rebuts these objections. First, it provides an analytic framework to understand alienation—distinguishing its various conceptual, explanatory, and normative dimensions. Second, it accounts for the normative aspect of the critique of alienation by articulating it in terms of prudential and moral ideas of positive freedom regarding human flourishing and solidaristic empowerment. Finally, the normative account is developed further, and sharpened to respond to the four objections, through the introduction of the Dignitarian Approach—the view that we have reason to organize social life in such a way that we respond appropriately to the valuable features of individual human beings that give rise to their dignity. (shrink)

According to the principle of epistemic closure, knowledge is closed under known implication. The principle is intuitive but it is problematic in some cases. Suppose you know you have hands and you know that ‘I have hands’ implies ‘I am not a brain-in-a-vat’. Does it follow that you know you are not a brain-in-a-vat? It seems not; it should not be so easy to refute skepticism. In this and similar cases, we are confronted with a puzzle: epistemic closure is an (...) intuitive principle, but at times, it does not seem that we know by implication. In response to this puzzle, the literature has been mostly polarized between those who are willing to do away with epistemic closure and those who think we cannot live without it. But there is a third way. Here I formulate a restricted version of the principle of epistemic closure. In the standard version, the principle can range over any proposition; in the restricted version, it can only range over those propositions that are within the limits of a given epistemic inquiry and that do not constitute the underlying assumptions of the inquiry. If we adopt the restricted version, I argue, we can preserve the advantages associated with closure, while at the same time avoiding the puzzle I’ve described. My discussion also yields an insight into the nature of knowledge. I argue that knowledge is best understood as a topic-restricted notion, and that such a conception is a natural one given our limited cognitive resources. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of human dignity based on a discussion of Kant's moral and political philosophy and then shows its relevance for articulating and developing in a fresh way some normative dimensions of Marx’s critique of capitalism as involving exploitation, domination, and alienation, and the view of socialism as involving a combination of freedom and solidarity. What is advanced here is not Kant’s own conception of dignity, but an account that partly builds on that conception and partly criticizes (...) it. The same is the case with the account of socialism in relation to Marx’s work. As articulated, Kantian dignity and Marxian socialism turn out to be quite appealing and mutually supportive. (shrink)

This paper explores the relations between self-esteem and competition. Self-esteem is a very important good and competition is a widespread phenomenon. They are commonly linked, as people often seek self-esteem through success in competition. Although competition in fact generates valuable consequences and can to some extent foster self-esteem, empirical research suggests that competition has a strong tendency to undermine self-esteem. To be sure, competition is not the source of all problematic deficits in self-esteem, and it can arise for, or undercut (...) goods other than self-esteem. But the relation between competition and access to self-esteem is still significant, and it is worth asking how we might foster a desirable distribution of the latter in the face of difficulties created by the former. That is the question addressed in this paper. The approach I propose neither recommends self-denial nor the uncritical celebration of the rat race. It charts instead a solidaristic path to support the social conditions of the self-esteem of each individual. The paper proceeds as follows. I start, in section 2, by clarifying key concepts involved in the discussion. In section 3, I identify ten mechanisms that support individuals’ self-esteem and impose limits on competition. I focus, in particular, on the challenges faced by people in their practices of work. In section 4, I outline prudential and moral arguments to justify the use of the proposed mechanisms. Section 5 concludes with remarks on the role of social criticism in the processes of change implementing the mechanisms. (shrink)

In a common, pejorative sense of it, ideology consists in attitudes whose presence contributes to sustaining, by making them seem legitimate, social orders that are problematic. An important way a social order can be problematic concerns the prospects for well-being facing the people living in it. It can make some people wind up worse off than they could and should be. They have “real interests” that are not properly served by the social order, and the interests aligned with it are (...) in fact “false,” merely “apparent,” or “distorted.” Ideology critique consists in part in noting the existence of such different interests, and in challenging the latter to facilitate the fulfillment of the former. This picture of ideology critique implies that ideology thwarts well-being. This paper aims to clarify, develop, and vindicate this picture. It argues that ideology critique should indeed draw (inter alia) on prudential considerations, and that a specifically objectivist view of well-being would be fitting. The fruitfulness of this approach is shown by exploring the specific case of the critique of working practices in contemporary capitalism. (shrink)

We perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision —to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results (...) presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the nature of evidential reasoning, the characteristic difficulties encountered, and the tools to address these difficulties. Our focus is on evidential reasoning in criminal cases. There is an extensive scholarly literature on these topics, and it is a secondary aim of the chapter to provide readers the means to find their way in historical and ongoing debates.

This paper explores the significance of dignity for our understanding of the rights of workers. It surveys important uses of the idea of dignity in several discursive contexts, and offers an interpretation that illuminates the content, scope, and normative force of labor rights. The discursive contexts considered include human rights, socialism, Kantian practical philosophy, and Christian social thought. The interpretation of dignity offered illuminates basic rights to decent conditions in which workers for example choose their occupation, receive adequate remuneration, and (...) are able to form unions to defend their interests. It is also illuminates more ambitious rights to work in ways that fully further workers’ interests in flourishing and involve avoidance or minimization of their domination, exploitation, and alienation. (shrink)

This note discusses three issues that Allen and Pardo believe to be especially problematic for a probabilistic interpretation of standards of proof: (1) the subjectivity of probability assignments; (2) the conjunction paradox; and (3) the non-comparative nature of probabilistic standards. I offer a reading of probabilistic standards that avoids these criticisms.